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SALAZAR V. BUONO: SACRED SYMBOLISM AND 
THE SECULAR STATE 
Ian Bartrum* 
After oral argument, Salazar v. Buono looked like it might be a dud.  
As Adam Liptak observed in the New York Times, the Justices spent most 
of their energy pressing then-Solicitor General Elena Kagan and her oppo-
nent, Peter Eliasberg of the ACLU, on the case’s tangled procedural history, 
and “only Justice Antonin Scalia appeared inclined to reach the Establish-
ment Clause question” that gave rise to the legal controversy.1  But, in the 
intervening months, the case has gotten more and more interesting.  First, 
most members of the Court did—in at least some way—reach the substan-
tive merits in the decision; ironically, only Justices Scalia and Clarence 
Thomas would have disposed of the case on standing grounds.  And second, 
in a twist no one saw coming, the Latin cross at the heart of the dispute dis-
appeared just a few days after the Court announced its decision.2  As a re-
sult, a case that seemed doomed to founder on its awkward procedural 
posture has, at least fleetingly, brought the Establishment Clause back into 
the national spotlight.  Given the complexity of the procedural questions, 
however, it is probably worthwhile to revisit the case’s history before mov-
ing on to the more intriguing substantive questions the Court’s opinions 
present. 
The controversy centers on an eight-foot-tall cross, made of metal tub-
ing and painted white, perched atop a rocky outcropping called Sunrise 
Rock, in the heart of the Mojave Desert National Preserve.  The Veterans of 
Foreign Wars first put up a wooden cross at the site—on what was then Bu-
reau of Land Management property—in 1934, along with a plaque memo-
rializing the “Dead of All Wars”; though the plaque has since disappeared, 
and the cross has been replaced several times.3  For being “in the middle of 
nowhere,” as Chief Justice John Roberts put it, the cross has been the focus 
of surprising attention over the last ten years.4  The trouble started in 1999, 
 
  
*  Assistant Professor of Law, Drake Law School.  Thanks to the other participants in this sympo-
sium for their insightful comments and suggestions.  Thanks also to the editors of the Colloquy for their 
hard work, and to my students for their inspiration and creativity. 
1  Adam Liptak, Religion Largely Absent in Argument About Cross, NYTIMES.COM, Oct. 7, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/08/us/08scotus.html (link). 
2  Randal C. Archibold, Cross at Center of Legal Dispute Disappears, NYTIMES.COM, May 11, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/12/us/12cross.html (link). 
3  Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1205 (C.D. Cal. 2002).  
4  Transcript of Oral Argument at 54, Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (No. 08-472). (link). 
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when the National Park Service denied a local man’s request to build a 
Buddhist stupa at the site and announced its decision to take the cross down 
instead.5  Apparently shocked by this development, Congress promptly de-
nied the Park Service any appropriation to remove the cross; then designat-
ed it a national memorial to veterans of World War I; and, for good 
measure, prohibited the use of federal money to “dismantle” any World 
War I memorials.6 
In the meantime, Frank Buono, a former Park Service administrator, 
brought suit in federal district court, alleging that the presence of the cross 
on government property “not open to groups or individuals [wishing] to 
erect other freestanding, permanent displays” violated the Establishment 
Clause.7  The court agreed, concluding that “the presence of the cross on 
federal land conveys a message of endorsement of religion,” and perma-
nently enjoined the government from allowing its display.8  While the gov-
ernment’s appeal was pending, the Park Service hid the cross under a 
plywood box,9 and Congress directed the Secretary of the Interior to convey 
the disputed acre of land (now a National Memorial) to the VFW in ex-
change for a similar parcel elsewhere in the Mojave Preserve—with the 
proviso that the property would revert to the government if it was no longer 
“maintained as a war memorial.”10  The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Dis-
trict Court’s Establishment Clause analysis, though it expressly reserved 
judgment on whether the proposed land exchange might solve the constitu-
tional problem.11 
The government chose not to appeal the Ninth Circuit’s decision and 
that judgment—including its confirmation of Buono’s standing to sue—
became final.  Buono, however, took preemptive action by asking the Dis-
trict Court to enforce or modify the existing injunction to prevent the Secre-
tary of the Interior from following through with the land swap.12  The 
District Court agreed with Buono’s contention that the Secretary’s ex-
change scheme was essentially a sham: “In light of [its unusual] histo-
ry . . . the proposed transfer of the subject property can only be viewed as 
 
  
5  Buono, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1205–06. 
6  See id. at 1206–07; Consolidated Appropriation Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554 § 133, 114 Stat. 
2763A-230 (2001) (link); Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Re-
cover from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-117 
§ 8137(a), 115 Stat. 2278 (2002) (link); Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2003, Pub. L. No. 
107-248 § 8065(b), 116 Stat. 1551 (2003) (link). 
7  Brief for the Petitioners at 5, Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (No. 08-472), 2009 WL 
1526915 [hereinafter Pet. Brief]; see Buono, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1207. 
8  See Buono, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1217. 
9  Pet. Brief at 5.  
10  Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-87 § 8121, 117 Stat. 1100 
(2004) (link). 
11  Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 546, 550 (9th Cir. 2004) (link). 
12  Pet. Brief, supra note 7, at 7.  Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1176–77 (C.D. Cal. 2005) 
(link). 
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an attempt to keep the Latin cross atop Sunrise Rock without actually cur-
ing the continuing Establishment Clause violation.”13  Accordingly, the 
court permanently enjoined the exchange as “an unlawful attempt to evade” 
its earlier injunction,14 which the Ninth Circuit subsequently affirmed.15  It 
was at this point that the Supreme Court finally got involved.16 
The upshot of this tortured procedural odyssey—particularly the gov-
ernment’s decision not to appeal the original injunction—is that the case 
presented the Court with two fairly narrow questions: (1) whether the Dis-
trict Court’s 2005 order enjoining the land exchange was, in essence, a new 
proceeding, such that the government might renew its challenge to Buono’s 
standing; and (2) whether the District Court had mistakenly concluded that 
the land swap would not remedy the Establishment Clause violation.  Only 
Justices Scalia and Thomas answered the first question affirmatively,17 
while two others—Justice Samuel Alito and Chief Justice Roberts—joined 
in Justice Anthony Kennedy’s conclusion that the District Court had erred 
on the merits.18  The remaining four Justices answered no to both ques-
tions.19 
Although the procedural issues are certainly interesting in their own 
right, I want to explore several of the substantive implications of the 
Court’s decision.  The opinions give rise to two particularly interesting 
questions—one doctrinal, the other more prudential and structural.  Doctri-
nally, as Salazar is the first Establishment Clause case decided since Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor’s retirement, it offers the first actual glimpse into the 
future of her pet “endorsement” test—and its future seems, to me, to be in 
some doubt.  Second, Justice Kennedy’s lengthy discussion of the secular 
purposes behind the government’s efforts to preserve the cross memorial 
raises—for me, at least—troubling questions about the Court’s increasing 
desire to strip sacred symbols of their religious meaning and significance.  
If this is in fact happening, I suggest it is evidence that we have lost sight of 
one of the fundamental purposes of religious disestablishment—protecting 




13  Buono, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 1182. 
14  Id. at 1182 n.8. 
15  Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1085 (9th Cir. 2007).  A request for rehearing was denied 
after a slight modification to the 2007 opinion to highlight the importance of a fact-based analysis for 
the endorsement test.  Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2007). 
16  Salazar v. Buono, 129 S. Ct 1313 (2009) (mem.) (link). 
17  Salazar, 130 S.Ct 1803, 1825–27 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
18  Id. at 1821 (Roberts, C.J., concurring; Alito, J., concurring). 
19  Id. at 1842–43 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see id. at 1841 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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I. THE FUTURE OF THE ENDORSEMENT TEST 
The District Court, the Ninth Circuit, and three of the Supreme Court 
dissenters evaluated Buono’s challenge within the doctrinal framework of 
the so-called endorsement test, which asks whether a reasonable observer 
would perceive that the state has “endorsed” religion.20  This test has 
evolved over the last three decades (with Justice O’Connor’s careful nurtur-
ing) into the Court’s principal means of assessing whether a religious dis-
play on public land has the “primary effect” of advancing religion, per the 
second prong of the Lemon test.21  O’Connor’s efforts to refine Lemon be-
gan in 1984 with her concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly, a case that chal-
lenged a Christmas display in a public park in Pawtucket, Rhode Island.22  
The majority upheld the display under the Lemon test, and O’Connor con-
curred in the judgment, writing separately “to suggest a clarification of our 
Establishment Clause doctrine.”23  In her view, the establishment touch-
stone, at least in the context of religious displays, is whether the govern-
ment’s actions amount to an endorsement of religion.24  Thus, she suggested 
that Lemon’s first two prongs are best understood as an effort to determine 
whether the government intends such an endorsement, and whether the 
government activity in fact conveys such an endorsement.25  The third 
prong, addressing the potential of an “excessive entanglement” between 
church and state, is less relevant in the context of a religious display.26 
Over the next few years, O’Connor’s endorsement test gained support 
in the lower federal courts, and in 1989 she managed to get the support of a 
majority of her colleagues, at least regarding the proper application of Lem-
on’s second prong.27  In Allegheny County v. ACLU, the Court again ad-
dressed several religious holiday displays on public property; this time, in 
Pittsburgh.28  Using O’Connor’s approach, the majority evaluated the like-
lihood that a reasonable observer might perceive government endorsement 
of religion and, based on the specific symbolism and context, invalidated a 
 
  
20  Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d at 548–49; Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1215–16; Salazar, 
130 S.Ct 1832 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
21  Lemon famously formulated a three-part Establishment Clause test: “First, the statute must have a 
secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor 
inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with reli-
gion.’”  Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (link).  For a thoughtful account of this doc-
trine’s evolution in various contexts, see Mary Jean Dolan, Government Identity Speech and Religion: 
The Endorsement Test After Summum, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. (forthcoming 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1548761 (link).  
22  465 U.S. 668 (1984) (link). 
23  Id. at 687 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
24  Id. at 690. 
25  Id. 
26  See id. at 689. 
27  Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S 573, 595–96 (1989) (link). 
28  Id. at 587–88. 
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crèche in the central stair of the city courthouse.29  At the same time, it al-
lowed the display of a Christmas tree and a Menorah in a public park.30  But 
just as notable as the majority’s acceptance of the endorsement test was Jus-
tice Kennedy’s impassioned dissent, in which he both decried O’Connor’s 
framework as “flawed in its fundamentals and unworkable in practice,”31 
and went to great lengths to demonstrate the “hostility” her test expresses 
towards our national religious heritage.32 
In truth, it is the “flawed in its fundamentals” criticism that lies at the 
heart of Kennedy’s disagreement with O’Connor.33  At root, Kennedy—like 
several prominent scholars34—views the Establishment Clause as comple-
menting the Free Exercise Clause in protecting individual religious “duty” 
from state intrusion; not, as the endorsement test seems to suggest, as the 
guarantor of a “secular state.”  The religious duty conception of disestab-
lishment sees a First Amendment violation only when the government 
forces citizens to choose between their obligations to the state and their ob-
ligations to God.  To put it more bluntly, democratic government should not 
require a choice between jail and eternal damnation.35  In this conception, an 
established church is simply an especially virulent species of this tyranny.  
The secular state view of disestablishment, which underlies the endorse-
ment test, recalls the French doctrine of laicité: the state should remain to-
tally neutral on religious questions and should do so by setting aside all 
religion and religious reasoning in favor of secular rationales and policies. 
Although the different approaches may seem a little like splitting theo-
retical hairs, the divergence of these first principles can, and sometimes 
does, lead to dramatically different results in particular cases.  Those who 
support the duty conception often see efforts to ensure a secular state as 
“hostile” towards religion, while secular state adherents worry that the 
state’s imprimatur on particular religious symbolism or speech makes unre-
presented groups feel excluded from their own government.  The doctrinal 
 
  
29  Id. at 598–602.  The Court had already suggested that O’Connor’s test seemed to ask the right 
questions just a year after Lynch, in School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389 (1985) 
(link). 
30  Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 618–20. 
31  Id. at 669 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
32  Id. at 655, 670–79. 
33  The “unworkable in practice” criticism centers on the problem of assessing what a “reasonable 
observer” might perceive.  This inquiry, however, seems no more difficult than that into the “psycholo-
gy” of coercion that Kennedy suggests.  Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593–94 (1992) (link). 
34  See, e.g., Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
346, 351 (2002) (locating the “liberty of conscience” at the Establishment Clause’s theoretical heart) 
(link); Steven D. Smith, Separation and the “Secular”: Reconstructing the Disestablishment Decision, 
67 TEX. L. REV. 955, 958–59 (1989) (arguing that disestablishment originally required institutional sepa-
ration rather than state secularism). 
35  For an excellent exploration of this view, see MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY AND DISCONTENT: 
AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 65–67 (1996) (link); and accord Feldman, supra note 
34, at 350–353. 
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result of all this is, for Kennedy, that coercion against duty, not government 
endorsement, represents the true establishment evil.  For Kennedy, this 
coercion might be direct or indirect—it may result from psychological 
kinds of pressure, as well as the threat of force—but it has nothing to do 
with endorsement, unless that endorsement rises to the level of coercion.36 
Kennedy’s view of coercion was, for a time, the only one—and the on-
ly alternative to O’Connor’s endorsement test.37  Lee v. Weisman changed 
all that, when Kennedy wrote for a majority that struck down a nonsectarian 
benediction at a middle school graduation.38  Despite O’Connor’s protesta-
tions in concurrence, Kennedy did not employ the endorsement test, but ra-
ther concluded that the benediction presented “a particular risk of indirect 
coercion.”39  This result drew a vigorous dissent from Scalia, who, along 
with Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Byron White and Tho-
mas, agreed that coercion is the relevant question, but rejected the “bound-
less, and boundlessly manipulable, test of psychological coercion” that 
Kennedy described.40  Rather, for Scalia, the only kind of coercion that 
gives rise to an establishment concern is direct—that accomplished by 
“force of law and threat of penalty.”41  And so, after Lee, the Court had arti-
culated three distinct establishment tests applicable in the religious speech 
context: O’Connor’s endorsement test, Kennedy’s “indirect coercion” test, 
and Scalia’s “direct coercion” test. 
For the most part, O’Connor’s approach has maintained the support of 
a tenuous majority since 1992,42 but, with her retirement in 2006, it was un-
clear whether the test would long survive.  Indeed, Salazar was the first true 
religious display case since her departure, and, as such, it presented an op-
portunity to assess the future of the endorsement test with a quick (and con-
cededly crude) count of heads.  Both Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and 
Sonia Sotomayor joined Justice John Paul Stevens’s dissent, which express-
 
  
36  Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 660–62 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
37  In her contribution to this symposium, Professor Dolan characterizes the split in religious sym-
bolism doctrine as one between “endorsement” and “history.”  Mary Jean Dolan, Salazar v. Buono: The 
Cross Between Endorsement and History, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 42 (2010), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/21/LRColl2010n21Dolan.pdf (link).  She is, 
of course, correct to note these two positions in recent cases, but I would suggest that “history” argu-
ments actually occur within the larger framework of the endorsement test: History advocates are simply 
trying to show that the symbolism has a secular purpose, and thus is not an endorsement of religion.  I 
contend that—if they had the votes—Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Scalia would toss out the en-
dorsement framework altogether and focus instead on coercion.  This, I think, is this ideological divide 
that is really at stake after O’Connor’s departure. 
38  505 U.S. 577, 586–87 (1992). 
39  Id. at 592. 
40  Id. at 632 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
41  Id. at 640 (emphasis in original). 
42  See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 690–92 (2005) (plurality) (evaluating whether a reli-
gious symbol has a purely “religious purpose”); id. at 699–701 (Breyer, J., concurring) (applying a form 
of the endorsement test); id. at 715–22 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (same); id. at 737–43 (Souter, J., dissent-
ing) (same) (link). 
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ly relied on the endorsement test and upheld the Ninth Circuit’s application 
of the same.43  In Salazar, Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a separate dissent in 
which he declined to reach the Establishment Clause question—arguing that 
the Ninth Circuit’s unappealed 2004 decision settled the issue—and would 
instead have upheld the 2005 order as a valid exercise of the District 
Court’s discretionary enforcement of its own injunction.44  In the past, how-
ever, Breyer has largely stood behind O’Connor’s framework—though he 
has, on occasion, given it his own spin.45  Therefore, I think it is safe to 
count at least four votes in favor of the endorsement test.  It is probably 
equally safe, however, to count at least three votes—Kennedy, Scalia, and 
Thomas—in staunch opposition, as the opinions in Salazar hardly suggest 
that the “coercion” coalition has had any change of heart since Lee. 
This leaves only the recent Bush appointees, Roberts and Alito, to con-
sider.  It is difficult to draw any meaningful conclusions from Roberts’s 
short (and, frankly, strange) concurrence in Salazar.46  The Chief Justice is a 
passionate and adroit doctrinalist, however, and the fact that he was not 
much concerned with the precise nature of the government’s effort to pre-
serve the cross suggests that he may put little stock in the nuances of the 
endorsement approach.47  Justice Alito’s concurrence provides a little more 
insight into his views, but again, it is no smoking gun.  The only direct clue 
he offered is an enigmatic bit of speculation: “Assuming that it is appropri-
ate to apply the so-called ‘endorsement test,’ this test would not be violated 
by the land exchange.”48  This is hardly a statement of unconditional sup-
port, though the remainder of his opinion—which would have overturned 
the District Court’s order without remand—indicates that he might be sym-
pathetic to the kinds of concerns that underlie the endorsement analysis.  He 
gives significant weight to factual matters such as the monument’s original 
purpose, the number of people likely to see it, and Congress’s intentions in 
undertaking the land swap.49  All of this suggests that Alito may be willing 
 
  
43  Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1832 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
44  Id. at 1842–43 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
45  See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 699–701 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (link).  In Van Orden,  Jus-
tice Breyer accepts the fundamentals of the endorsement approach, but he opines that “no exact formula 
can dictate a resolution in such fact-intensive cases.”  Id. at 700.  Instead, Breyer engages in an analysis 
of the combined “religious” and “secular moral” messages that such longstanding monuments may ex-
press.  Id. at 701.  Indeed, Breyer’s approach here is very similar to that which Kennedy takes in Sala-
zar. 
46  Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1821 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).  I say the Chief Justice’s concurrence is 
strange because he is prepared to decide the case based solely on the respondent’s questionable conces-
sion at oral argument suggesting that there would be no Establishment problem if the government took 
the cross down, transferred the land, and the private party then put a new cross up.  Not only is this a 
dubious concession, but it also fails to address the primary endorsement issue in the case, which is the 
extent of the government’s efforts to preserve the cross. 
47  Id. 
48  Id. at 1824 (Alito, J., concurring). 
49  Id. at 1821–23. 
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to work within the endorsement framework.  But he did vote to uphold the 
cross display, which is suggests that, at the very least, his ideas about what 
constitutes “endorsement” may be very different than O’Connor’s.  Thus, 
even if the endorsement test survives in name, it may end up being some-
thing closer to Kennedy’s indirect coercion test in application. 
This last thought raises the question, though: what’s in a name?  After 
all, it might not matter whether we call the test “endorsement” or “indirect 
coercion” if the analysis often produces the same outcome.  But I think 
there is a real and important distinction, which I hinted at above.  The doc-
trinal test the Court adopts necessarily reflects its conception of exactly 
what the Establishment Clause guarantees: Is it the promise of a “secular” 
state, as a prohibition on government endorsement would suggest?  Or does 
it protect against a particularly problematic species of Free Exercise intru-
sion; the likelihood that an established church will cause the state to coerce 
us against conscience?  And over the last 30 years or so, the tension and 
competition between these different, underlying principles has resulted in a 
number of subtle doctrinal compromises that are potentially destructive of 
our most fundamental disestablishment goals.  Indeed, Salazar presents a 
disquieting example of this phenomenon, as we see Kennedy—basically a 
believer in the “duty” conception of disestablishment—try to squeeze the 
Latin cross through the endorsement test by suggesting that it has lost its re-
ligious import and become a secular monument.50  This argumentative ap-
proach presents some very real theoretical problems, which the next Section 
explores in a little more detail. 
II. THE SACRED AND THE SECULAR 
Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in Salazar highlights a troubling 
question about the state’s role in both assessing and shaping the public 
meaning of religious symbols; one which emerges, I suggest, from the same 
fundamental disagreement over the meaning of disestablishment.  For Ken-
nedy, given Salazar’s procedural posture, the only issue before the Court 
was whether the District Court “engage[d] in the appropriate inquiry” be-
fore enjoining the land exchange as an effort to evade its earlier judgment.51  
Where the lower court went wrong, he wrote, was in its failing adequately 
 
  
50  It may seem incongruous that Kennedy would operate within the endorsement test here, which he 
has roundly rejected in the past.  But, to be fair, Kennedy was essentially saddled with this approach 
given Salazar’s procedural history.  He could only answer the narrow question of whether the District 
Court had enforced its own injunction (which was based on an endorsement analysis) correctly.  I sus-
pect that if the substantive question were squarely presented, he might happily have applied the indirect 
coercion test and avoided any discussion whatsoever of secular purpose or meaning.  This circumstance 
is one of the consequences of piecemeal adjudication that Professor Roy rightly laments in her contribu-
tion to this symposium.  See Lisa Shaw Roy, Salazar v. Buono: The Perils of Piecemeal Adjudication, 
105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 72 (2010), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/23/LRColl2010n23Roy.pdf (link). 
51  Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1815–16. 
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to consider the secular purpose behind the cross’s original placement, the 
secular meaning it has come to have for many local people over the last 75 
years, and the “dilemma” Congress faced in its efforts to cure the estab-
lishment violation without “conveying disrespect for those the cross was 
seen as honoring.”52  Ultimately, Kennedy claims that the District Court did 
not fully appreciate that this particular cross is a symbol “that has complex 
meaning beyond the expression of religious views.”53  While all this may be 
true, it fails to explain why—if the cross’s religious meaning is not central 
to its symbolism—the easiest solution would not be to replace it with a non-
religious memorial.  Despite Kennedy’s protestations about the monument’s 
lengthy history, over which period “the cross and the cause it commemo-
rated [became] entwined in the public consciousness,”54 it seems disinge-
nuous (some might say sacrilegious) to deny that the symbol’s deep 
religious significance adds something essential to the mix. 
But maybe not.  Maybe Kennedy is right when he claims that “a Latin 
cross is not merely a reaffirmation of Christian beliefs [but] a symbol often 
used to honor and respect those whose heroic acts, noble contributions and 
patient striving help secure an honored place in history for this Nation and 
its people.”55  But if that is true, if the cross has somehow lost much of its 
most central and profound meaning by virtue of its association with the 
state and its objectives, then I fear we have a real disestablishment problem 
on our hands.  Stanley Fish captured this growing concern in a recent New 
York Times editorial: “It is one of the ironies of the sequence of cases deal-
ing with religious symbols on public land that those who argue for their 
lawful presence must first deny them the significance that provokes the de-
sire to put them there in the first place.”56  Indeed, in this particular oral ar-
gument a “visibly angry” Justice Scalia scolded Peter Eliasberg for 
suggesting that the Latin cross is, in fact, a Christian symbol.57  It is this last 
absurdity that highlights what is most disturbing about the current doctrinal 
trend.  In truth, it is hard to blame the advocates for their efforts to empty 
symbols like the cross of their religious content; they simply tailor their ar-
guments to the Court’s doctrinal landscape.  And in recent years the Court 
has been a willing co-conspirator, if not the instigator, in a troubling effort 
to see the sacred as secular.58 
 
  
52  Id. at 1817. 
53  Id. at 1818. 
54  Id. at 1817. 
55  Id. at 1820.  I cannot help noting that here Kennedy tellingly, though perhaps unintentionally, mi-
nimizes the importance of Christian beliefs with an ill-placed “merely.” 
56  Stanley Fish, “When is a Cross a Cross?”, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (May 3, 2010), 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/03/when-is-a-cross-a-cross (link). 
57  Liptak, supra note 1; accord Oral Arguments, supra note 4, at 39 (calling the thought that the 
cross honors only Christian dead “an outrageous conclusion”). 
58  See, e.g., McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 
(2005). 
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This suggests two equally problematic possibilities: (1) the Court itself 
is actively working to diminish the religious meanings of sacred symbol-
ism; or (2) the Court is willing to accept and sanction the idea that long as-
sociation with government can wash away a religious symbol’s central 
significance.  If either (or both) of these propositions is true, then I fear that 
we have been poor stewards of the disestablishment promise.  Most, if not 
all, establishment scholars recognize that one of the clause’s central theoret-
ical purposes is to protect religion from the corruptive power of the state.59  
This strand of disestablishment theory, often called the “evangelical” 
strand, has long been associated with Roger Williams’s efforts to wall off 
the “garden” of the church from the “wilderness” of the state.60  And if 
Kennedy is correct about the “secularizing” power an association with state 
objectives can have on sacred symbols, then it seems that Williams’s gar-
den is in real danger of being overrun.  This is, in fact, the very danger that 
Mark DeWolfe Howe warned of in his prescient book, now more than forty 
years old, on the modern elevation of the “rationalistic” conception of dises-
tablishment.61  Indeed, if all Kennedy says is true, Frank Buono need not 
waste any more energy trying to get the cross off Sunrise Rock; the gov-
ernment has done it for him.  Thus, however exciting Salazar may seem to 
religious enthusiasts as a short-term win, one cannot help but suspect that, 
in the long run, these same people may come to believe that victory came at 
too steep a price.62 
 
  
59  Feldman, supra note 34 at 349–51; see Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablish-
ment, and Doctrinal Development: Part 1: The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV.1381, 
1386–90 (1967) (summarizing scholarly strands). 
60  See, e.g., MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND 
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1965) (arguing for a renewed emphasis on the 
“evangelical” thesis).  The famous passage from Roger Williams is as follows: 
 
[W]hen [the Christians] have opened a gap in the hedge or wall of Separation between the Gar-
den of the Church and the Wilderness of the world, God hath ever broke down the wall it[]self[], 
removed the Candlestick, etc., and made His Garden a Wilderness[], as at this day.  And that 
therefore if he will ever please to restore his garden and Paradi[s]e again, it must of necessit[y] 
be walled in peculiarly unto himself[] from the world, and that all that shall be saved out of the 
world are to be transplanted out of the Wilderness of the world . . . . 
 
Roger Williams, “Mr. Cotton’s Letter Lately Printed, Examined and Answered” (1644) reprinted in 
1 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 108 (Russell & Russell, Inc. 1963).  In his contribu-
tion to this symposium, Professor Lund points out the danger to religion that too close an association of 
its symbols with the state presents.  See Christopher Lund, Salazar v. Buono and the Future of the Es-
tablishment Clause, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 60 (2010), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/22/LRColl2010n22Lund.pdf (link). 
61  HOWE, supra note 60, at 10–11 (lamenting the Court’s efforts to prove that “the only theory of 
separation known in American constitutional history is the Jeffersonian or rationalistic”). 
62  For an interesting early perspective on this issue, see Rod Dreher, Commentary: The Cross With-
out Christ, BELIEFNET (May 5. 2010), http://blog.beliefnet.com/roddreher/2010/05/the-cross-without-
christ.html (link). 




For a case that seemed destined to disappoint, Salazar v. Buono ended 
up providing Establishment Clause observers with some surprising late-
term fireworks.  Not only did the Justices, by and large, reach and comment 
on the substantive constitutional question, but they did so in ways that high-
light interesting and problematic questions about the Court’s past and future 
treatment of religious symbolism on public land.  On the one hand, the var-
ious opinions seem to suggest that the endorsement test, at least as we have 
known it, faces an uncertain future.  On the other hand, Justice Kennedy’s 
plurality opinion implicitly bows to the secular purpose and meaning inqui-
ries at that test’s heart, but argues that the District Court failed to give ade-
quate consideration to the complex interests the cross on Sunrise Rock has 
come to represent.  It is no mystery why Kennedy and others feel compelled 
to treat the cross and other religious symbols on public land as “predomi-
nantly secular”;63 they are reacting to a doctrinal culture they see disman-
tling valued pieces of our cultural heritage in its vigilance to insulate the 
state from the threatening influence of religion.  But this current tactic—the 
effort to downplay religious meanings in order to minimize the threat—is 
counterproductive; indeed, it seems far more hostile to religion than the en-
dorsement doctrine to which Kennedy has so vehemently objected.  Better, 
one would think, to protest forthrightly the doctrine of the secular state than 
to play along in ways that threaten to abandon the “other” disestablishment 
goal: protecting the sanctity and vitality of the American religious garden 
from the wilderness of the bureaucratic state. 
But I am trying hard here not to take a side in this fight.  I want to sug-
gest only that Salazar sets the important doctrinal and structural issues in 
bold relief, and asks very old questions in slightly new ways.  In so doing, it 
illustrates some interesting connections between divergent first principles 
and our modern doctrinal battles—and highlights at least one potential 
long-term consequence of the coercion coalition’s current argumentative 
approach.  While the opinions in Salazar do not provide any clear or defini-
tive answers, they at least set the stage for a potentially new, post-O’Connor 
era of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  And it will be quite interesting 
indeed to see what this era brings for American religious and political life. 
 
  
63  The phrase is from taken from Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Van Orden.  545 U.S. at 702 
(Breyer, J., concurring). 
